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where the duty of the party perform-
ing the service is defined by the
contract between the [party] and
[the] client." Kanter, 648 N.E.2d at
1139. In this case, the court con-
cluded that Deitelbaum's duty to the
plaintiffs to provide the requisite
competent service fell outside of the
scope of duties imposed by the
written contract and that this
additional contractual professional
duty is not subject to the economic
loss doctrine. The court held that the
plaintiffs could proceed with their
charges of negligence and were not
barred from recovering damages for
purely economic losses. The court
reversed the lower court's ruling and
remanded the case for a ruling in
concert with the appellate court
opinion.
LDDL contraceptive manufacturer has no duty to
warn that use of "'The Pill" during pregnancy may
cause birth defects
by Lessie A. Gerhold-Lepp
In Martin by Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661
N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1996), the Illinois Supreme Court held
that, under the learned intermediary doctrine, a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer who fails to directly warn a
patient of the possible side effects of an oral contracep-
tive is not liable despite a federal regulation requiring
such warnings. The court stated that a manufacturer's
duty ends when the manufacturer furnishes the neces-
sary warnings to the prescribing physician.
Clyntie Martin ("Martin") visited her physician, Dr.
Sloniewicz ("Sloniewicz"), in April 1979, complaining
of cramps and a missed menstrual period. During this
appointment, Sloniewicz informed Martin she was not
pregnant. At a subsequent appointment, Martin told
Sloniewicz her concern about becoming pregnant,
Sloniewicz reaffirmed that she was not pregnant.
Sloniewicz prescribed Ortho-Novum 1/50, an oral
contraceptive product of the Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corporation ("Ortho"). Sloniewicz instructed Martin to
begin use of the contraceptive at the end of her next
menstrual cycle; however, Martin began use of the
contraceptive seven days after her second visit to
Sloniewicz. Martin discovered that she was pregnant
after another missed menstrual period in July 1979. On
December 8, 1979, Martin gave birth to Robert Lee
Martin III ("Robert"). Robert was born with deformities
to his arms, hands, and fingers.
In February 1981, Robert Lee Martin, Jr., and Clyntie
Martin ("the Martins") filed suit against Ortho on behalf
of their son. The Martins sought damages against
Sloniewicz for malpractice and against Ortho, alleging
that the contraceptive caused Robert's deformities.
Sloniewicz settled with the Martins in 1983. The
Martins voluntarily dismissed their action against Ortho.
However, the Martins refiled on January 7, 1991.
Courts apply learned intermediary
doctrine to case
The Martins alleged Ortho-Novum 1/50 was "unrea-
sonably dangerous" because it carried no warning to
consumers that it would cause birth defects if taken
during pregnancy. Ortho argued the learned intermediary
doctrine applied and the doctrine limited its duty to warn
the physician who prescribed the drug. Ortho argued that
its warnings to Sloniewicz were adequate as a matter of
law. The circuit court granted summary judgment in
Ortho's favor.
The appellate court, reversing the lower court, found
that the learned intermediary doctrine contained an
exception which applied to oral contraceptive manufac-
turers. The Supreme Court granted Ortho's appeal and
allowed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of both parties.
The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the learned
intermediary doctrine in Kirk v.. Michael Reese Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1987). The doctrine, an
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exception to strict liability in tort, applies to manufactur-
ers who fail to warn of a product's dangers. The doctrine
requires drug manufacturers to wam only the prescrib-
ing physician of any dangers involved with a drug. The
physician has the duty to warn the patient of any dangers
associated with the drug.
Plaintiff argues exception to the doctrine
created by federal regulation
The Martins argued that a federal regulation provides
an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for
oral contraceptives. The regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501
(1978), in part, states:
[Tihe safe and effective use of oral
contraceptive[s]... requires that patients be fully
informed of the benefits and risks involved ....
Information in lay language concerning effective-
ness, contradiction, warnings, precautions, and
adverse reactions shall be furnished to each patient
.... This information shall be given to the patient
by the dispenser in the form of a brief summary of
certain essential information included in each
package dispensed ... and in a longer detailed
labeling piece in or accompanying each package
dispensed to each patient. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501
(1978).
The Martins conceded that the warnings Ortho gave
to Sloniewicz were adequate, under the learned interme-
diary doctrine. However, the Martins asserted that the
regulation created an exception for instances in which
the learned intermediary doctrine would not apply. The
issue before the Court was whether the regulation
creates a duty upon a pharmaceutical manufacturer to
directly warn users.
Violation of statute doctrine not
applicable to plaintiff
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the appellate
court erred when it found that the Martins possessed a
private right of action under the violation of statute
doctrine, which views a violation of statute as prima
facie evidence of negligence. The violation of statute
doctrine requires that the plaintiff "fall within the class
intended to be protected; and.., the injury suffered ...
[must be] a direct and proximate result of the violation."
The supreme court stated the appellate court did not
consider the legislative intent of Section 310.501 which
was necessary because no specific statutory authority
granted a cause of action. The supreme court further
emphasized the importance of such considerations
where the plaintiff pursues action under a federal
regulation which conflicts with existing state law.
In order to recover, the Martins needed to show that
Section 310.501 carries a private cause of action. The
supreme court stated that Congress did not intend to
create such a cause of action, especially those private
actions under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA").
Federal regulation does not create
additional duty for defendant
The Martins admitted that the FDCA created no
private cause of action but argued that the regulation
established a duty for Ortho, citing Grove Fresh Distrib.,
Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, 720 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. I11.
1989). In Grove Fresh, the court allowed the plaintiff to
recover under the Lanham Act for the defendant's
misrepresentation of its orange juice in violation of the
FDA. In that case, the court emphasized that although
there is not a recognized private cause of action under
the FDCA, a plaintiff may rely on the FDA regulation to
establish the standard duty a defendant must meet.
In Grove Fresh, the supreme court indicated that the
FDA regulation was relevant to whether the Lanham Act
had been violated. Distinguishing Grove Fresh from the
present case, the court recognized that in Grove Fresh
the Lanham Act afforded plaintiffs a private cause of
action. However, in the present case, Martin was not
provided a statutory right of action. The court concluded
that Grove Fresh was not applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding its ruling, the court recognized that a
minority of courts refuse to follow the learned interme-
diary doctrine.
Declining to recognize an exception for contraceptive
manufacturers, the supreme court held that Ortho
provided sufficient warnings to the prescribing physi-
cian and, therefore, fulfilled its duty. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court and
affirmed the circuit court.
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